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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ronald Anderson appeals, challenging several aspects of his case-errors which 
he asserts should result in the vacation or reversal of his conviction. First, he contends 
the district court violated his constitutional right to due process because it deprived him 
of an adequate record for review by failing to maintain a copy of the written post-proof 
jury instructions in the record. As the appellate courts review de nova the validity of 
written jury instructions, both in terms of the language used and the manner in which 
those instructions are presented, the failure to preserve a copy of those written 
instructions for review deprived Mr. Anderson of an adequate appellate record, and 
thus, due process. 
Second, Mr. Anderson contends that the prosecutor engaged in numerous 
incidents of misconduct during his closing arguments. The prosecutor affirmatively 
vouched for the evidence he presented on at least three different occasions. He also 
vouched against the evidence Mr. Anderson presented, describing it repeatedly as 
"unbelievable." The prosecutor repeatedly misstated the law in regard to whether the 
defendant had to present evidence, and in doing so, impermissibly misrepresented the 
burden of proof. Finally, the prosecutor disparaged both Mr. Anderson's attorney and 
his defense theory. Because of the specific facts of this case, the error caused by that 
misconduct is not harmless. Therefore, each incident of misconduct was not harmless, 
as it is not possible to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that each statement did 
not contribute to the verdict. And even if this Court finds that each error is individually 
harmless, when accumulated, those errors did deprive Mr. Anderson of his 
constitutional rights, thereby entitling him to the appropriate remedy. 
1 
Based on these errors, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that his conviction be 
reversed, or alternatively, that his conviction be vacated and his case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Anderson was working construction in Missoula, Montana in the spring of 
2010. (Supp. Tr., p.219, Ls.13-16.) 1 As that project wound down, his employer helped 
him get a position doing different maintenance-type jobs at the Lochsa Lodge near 
Powell, ldaho.2 (Supp. Tr., p.220, Ls.2-14; Supp. Tr., p.76, Ls.17-25.) That job began 
at the end of May, and Mr. Anderson only planned on staying there until July. (Supp. 
Tr., p.221, Ls.3-9; p.223, Ls.9-13.) However, during that time he was charged with 
raping another of the employees there, Stephanie Jo Morrison. (See R., p.21.) He 
exercised his right to a trial, where a jury found him guilty. (R., p.68.) The district court 
initially granted Mr. Anderson's motion for a new trial when a material witness, whose 
whereabouts had been unknown at the time of the trial, was located. (R., pp.95-108.) 
That decision, however, was reversed on appeal. (See Docket Number 36319, Court of 
Appeals 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 610.) On remand, Mr. Anderson was 
sentenced to a unified term of eighteen years, with nine years fixed. (R., pp.161-62.) 
1 The transcripts in this case are contained in several, individually paginated volumes. 
To promote clarity, the volume containing the majority of the transcripts, (such as the 
final pretrial hearing, et a/.) will be referred to as "Vol.1." The volume containing the 
transcript of his sentencing hearing will be referred to as "Vol.2." In addition, the Idaho 
Supreme Court took judicial notice of the contents in its file from the State's prior appeal 
in this case (docket number 36319). (Order Granting Motion that the Court take Judicial 
Notice, filed May 17, 2012.) Included in that record are the transcripts of the trial itself, 
as well as the February 12, 2009, hearing on Mr. Anderson's motion for a new trial. 
Those transcripts are contained in two volumes which are consecutively paginated. 
Therefore, they will be collectively referred to as "Supp. Tr." 
2 
According to Mr. Anderson, he had seen Ms. Morrison around the Lodge, as they 
both worked there. (See, e.g., Supp. Tr., p.229, Ls.14-23.) Their relationship was "U]ust 
the normal casual thing .... She was friendly. I was friendly. Respectable, as always, 
and that was it." (Supp. Tr., p.235, Ls.20-23.) Mr. Anderson testified that, on the night 
in question, he went down to the bar where several other lodge employees, including 
Ms. Morrison, were spending their evening. (See generally Supp. Tr., pp.237-39.) Both 
Mr. Anderson and Ms. Morrison admitted to drinking alcohol. 3 (Supp. Tr., p.242, L.7; 
p.192, Ls.14-15.) Mr. Anderson testified that Ms. Morrison was being exceedingly 
friendly toward him after she got in an argument with one of the other lodge workers, 
Chris Prall. 4 (See Supp. Tr., p.239, L.18 - p.240, L.18.) Ms. Morrison testified that she 
left the bar at approximately 9:30. (See Supp. Tr., p.196, Ls.9-16.) She returned to the 
trailer she shared with Jason Black, who left after she returned. (Supp. Tr., p.178, 
Ls.10-25.) 
Mr. Anderson testified that Mr. Black came down to the bar and they left together. 
(Supp. Tr., p.245, L.15 - p.246, L.5.) Mr. Black and Mr. Anderson walked to the cabin 
where Mr. Anderson was staying, which he also shared with Phil Wessler. (Supp. 
Tr., p.247, Ls.1-6; Supp. Tr. p.268, L.25 - p.269, L.6.) Mr. Wessler recalled being 
2 The Lodge has a street address in Lolo, Montana, for emergency services purposes. 
(Supp. Tr., p.76, Ls.17-19.) The Lodge itself is in Idaho County. (See, e.g., Supp. 
Tr., p.124, Ls.4-6.) 
3 In addition to the four beers Ms. Morrison testified to having at the bar, she 
also testified that she had a "Vodka Red Bull" before going to the bar. (Supp. Tr., p.195, 
L.23 - p.196, L.3.) As a result, she was feeling "buzzed" by the end of the evening. 
(Supp. Tr., p.192, Ls.14-15.) Mr. Anderson admitted to having about five beers. 
isupp. Tr., p.242, L.7.) 
Mr. Prall and Ms. Morrison were in a dating-type relationship. (Supp. 
Tr., p.205, Ls.15-17.) She confirmed that they had been in an argument at the bar that 
evening and agreed to go their separate ways, but said they reconciled the next day. 
(Tr., p.205, Ls.18-23.) 
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woken by the conversation Mr. Black and Mr. Anderson were having when they 
returned at approximately 11 :30. (Supp. Tr., p.270, Ls.5-13.) Mr. Wessler testified that 
he heard Mr. Black tell Mr. Anderson that Ms. Morrison wanted Mr. Anderson to come to 
her trailer because she wanted to "hook up with him." (Supp. Tr., p.271, L.18 - p.272, 
L.10.) Mr. Wessler testified that Mr. Anderson said that sounded alright, but that he had 
no expectations for the evening. (Supp. Tr., p.272, Ls.16-19.) Mr. Anderson also 
testified that Mr. Black had told him Ms. Morrison had ended her relationship with 
Mr. Prall and wanted to hang out with Mr. Anderson that night. (Supp. Tr., p.247, Ls.6-
10.) Mr. Anderson testified that Mr. Black drove him up to Ms. Morrison's trailer and 
they both went inside.5 (Supp. Tr. p.248, Ls.1-23.) According to Mr. Anderson, 
Mr. Black left the trailer after seeing Ms. Morrison awake. (Supp. Tr., p.249, L.12 -
p.250, L.18.) 
Mr. Anderson testified that the situation turned sexual in nature and he and 
Ms. Morrison began to have consensual intercourse. (Supp. Tr., p.250, L.23 - p.255, 
L.14.) However, Mr. Anderson testified that, during their encounter, Ms. Morrison 
became upset. 6 She began talking about being in a relationship with Mr. Prall, and then 
5 Once he was finally located, Mr. Black gave testimony telephonically as part of the 
district court's consideration of Mr. Anderson's motion for a new trial. His testimony 
corroborated many of the major points of Mr. Anderson's version of events. For 
example, he also testified that Ms. Morrison was upset over the breakup and asked 
Mr. Black to get Mr. Anderson to come talk to her. (Supp. Tr., p.319, L.17 - p.320, 
L.21.) He also testified that Mr. Anderson had stayed at the trailer after Ms. Morrison 
had left, and Mr. Black encountered him there. (Supp. Tr., p.327, L.9 - p.328, L.2.) On 
other points, his memory differed from Mr. Anderson's. For example, he testified that 
Ms. Morrison had passed out on the couch by the time he returned with Mr. Anderson, 
and Mr. Anderson was trying to wake her up when Mr. Black left the trailer. 
(Supp. Tr., p.326, Ls.5-8.) Mr. Black also corroborated Mr. Wessler's testimony about 
the conversation which took place in Mr. Anderson's cabin. (See Supp. Tr., p.324, 
Ls.11-15.) 
6 Ms. Morrison is prescribed medication because she suffers from situational anxiety 
attacks related to post-traumatic stress disorder. (Supp. Tr., p.204, Ls.16 - p.205, 
4 
told Mr. Anderson that "they set you up." (Supp. Tr., p.255, L.15 - p.256, L.20.) At that 
point, he got up and went into the bathroom, and when he returned, Ms. Morrison was 
no longer in the room. (Supp. Tr., p.256, Ls.20-24.) 
Ms. Morrison had gone over to the neighboring trailer when she left Mr. Anderson 
in her trailer, and she encountered her neighbor, Richard MacDuff.7 (Supp. Tr., p.160, 
L.20, p.165, Ls.20-21.) He testified that he left the bar around 12:30 and walked to his 
trailer. (Supp. Tr., p.160, Ls.8-10.) He did not hear anything out of the ordinary as he 
approached his trailer. (See Supp. Tr., p.160, Ls.15-16; see also Prelim. Tr. p.77, L.23 -
p.78, L.15.) Shortly after he returned home, Ms. Morrison came in wearing only a shirt, 
which had a few drops of blood on it, and was hysterical. (Supp. Tr., p.160, Ls.10-21, 
p.163, Ls.21-22.) Mr. Mays came out of his room, and Ms. Morrison told them her 
version of the events. (See Supp. Tr., p.160, 11 -p.162, L.22.) 
According to Ms. Morrison, she was asleep on one of the couches in her trailer. 
(Supp. Tr., p.179, Ls.22-23.) She said she woke up to find Mr. Anderson fondling 
himself at the end of the couch. (Supp. Tr., p.179, L.20 - p.180, L.10.) She said he 
then tried to take her pants off and she struggled against him. After getting the pants 
off, Ms. Morrison claimed that he started having intercourse with her and she was 
screaming for help. (Supp. Tr., p.183, Ls.10-21.) She testified that Mr. Anderson 
punched her in the face each time she screamed, and that happened at least four 
times. (Supp. Tr., p.184, L.24 - p.185, L.9.) She testified that she struggled with him for 
some thirty to forty-five minutes, during which he penetrated her three times. 
L.14.) She had not taken the medication on the night in question. (Supp. Tr., p.204, 
Ls.18-19.) 
7 Mr. MacDuff stayed in the neighboring trailer with Mr. Prall, Neal Mays, and another 
lodge employee identified as "Jesse." (Supp. Tr., p.158, Ls.5-16.) 
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(See Supp. Tr., p.186, Ls.10-24.) She stated that "he was just really brutal and really 
mean." (Supp. Tr., p.188, Ls.12-13.) According to her, he also bit her finger once. 
(Supp. Tr., p.188, L.24 - p.189, L.9.) Between that and the cut on her lip from the 
punching, she testified she was bleeding a lot and got blood all over her blanket. 
(Supp. Tr., p.191, L.25 - p.192, L.1; Defense Exhibit Bat 12:20.)8 She claimed she was 
able to get him to stop by telling him she was going to vomit, at which point she ran out 
of the trailer to the neighboring trailer. (Supp. Tr., p.190, Ls.16-22.) The route she took 
to the neighboring trailer took her through some foliage and bushes. (Supp. Tr., p.193, 
Ls.5-18.) It also took her across a patch of gravel which Officer Wiggins described as 
"pretty harsh" and "rough." (See Supp. Tr., p.42, L.10 - p.43, L.16.) Based on what 
Ms. Morrison told them, Mr. Mays had Ms. Morrison go into his room and lock the door, 
and told Mr. MacDuff to go call 911.9 
Officer Wiggins received the call out in response to Mr. MacDuff's 911 call at 
12:48. (Supp. Tr., p.126, L.10.) Mr. MacDuffwaited for Officer Wiggins to respond, told 
him what was going on, and took him up to the trailer. (Supp. Tr., p.164, L.18 - p.165, 
L.3.) Officer Wiggins drove in his marked police vehicle. (Supp. Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14, 
L.1; Supp. Tr., p.71, Ls.21-25.) On the way, he saw Mr. Anderson, who was walking 
back down the road. (Supp. Tr., p.14, Ls.12-21.) 
Mr. Anderson had decided to wait for her to come back, putting on his clothes 
while doing so. (Supp. Tr., p.257, L.3 - p.258, L.12.) At that time, Mr. Black and Andy 
Hart, another lodge worker, came into the trailer and Mr. Black began to shout at 
8 Defense Exhibits A and B are audio recordings. Approximations of the time in the 
recording at which the relevant statements are provided where possible. 
9 There was no phone available at the trailer, so Mr. MacDuff left and went to the main 
lodge building, where he called the police. (Supp. Tr., p.162, L.23 - p.163, L.4, p.164, 
Ls.15-19.) 
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Mr. Anderson. (Supp. Tr., p.258, Ls.7-24.) Mr. Hart attempted to quell the situation and 
told Mr. Anderson to go down to his cabin and wait for the police, who were on their 
way, and Mr. Anderson followed his advice. (Supp. Tr., p.258, L.24 - p.259, L.6.) On 
his way back to his cabin, Officer Wiggins drove past him. (Supp. Tr., p.14, Ls.12-21.) 
Mr. Wessler testified that Mr. Anderson woke him upon returning to their cabin and 
told him what had happened. (Supp. Tr., p.273, Ls.7-14.) Mr. Wessler testified that 
Mr. Anderson said it was a consensual sexual encounter, then he had been confronted 
by the other employees, which had visibly shaken him. (Supp. Tr., p.273, Ls.7-14.) 
Mr. Wessler told Mr. Anderson to go lie down, get some sleep, and they would resolve 
the issue in the morning. (Supp. Tr., p.273, Ls.17-25.) 
Officer Wiggins continued up to the trailers, where he met with Ms. Morrison. 
(Supp. Tr., p.15, Ls.1-8.) The recorded interview lasted only a few minutes. (See 
Defendant's Exhibit A (evidencing an eight-minute interview).) During that interview, 
Ms. Morrison told Officer Wiggins that Mr. Anderson said some "Aryans" had told him to 
go up and take care of her. 10 (Defense Exhibit A; Defense Exhibit B at 8:00; see a/so 
Supp. Tr., p.187, L.24 - p.188, L.1.) Officer Wiggins took pictures of Ms. Morrison's 
noticeable injuries, which constituted a few cuts on her lips and an abrasion on her 
finger, none of which were bleeding at that time. (Supp. Tr., p.19, Ls.10-20; State's 
Exhibits 23-29.) She had told him that there was blood all over her blanket and the 
floor. (Defense Exhibit B at 12:20.) After interviewing her, Officer Wiggins released 
Ms. Morrison to the EMTs to be transported to a medical facility in Missoula. 
Officer Wiggins then went to Ms. Morrison's trailer and took a few pictures of 
the room. (Supp. Tr., p.29, L.10 - p.30, L.14; State's Exhibits 21-30, 34.) He did not 
7 
inspect the floor for blood, and did not remember actually seeing any. 11 (Supp. 
Tr., p.69, L.25 - p.70, L.14.) He did not secure the scene or seize evidence there (such 
as the blanket). (See Tr., Vol.1, p.104, Ls.14-16; Supp. Tr., p.102, L.24 - p.103, L.12 
(indicating he did not seize the blanket until a follow up investigation a week later).) He 
also did not follow up on his request for blood alcohol content (hereinafter, BAC) reports 
for either Mr. Anderson or Ms. Morrison. (Supp. Tr., p.118, Ls.1-7.) In fact, the nurse 
who processed Ms. Morrison in Missoula, Mary Pat Hansen, actually took blood and 
urine samples from Ms. Morrison, but did not follow up on the results from those 
samples. (Supp. Tr., p.150, Ls.4-10.) 
After that investigation, he left to go interview Mr. Anderson. Mr. Wessler 
answered the door when Officer Wiggins arrived at the cabin, accompanied by two 
other deputies who Mr. Wessler identified as having been dispatched from Missoula. 
(Supp. Tr., p.275, Ls.11-15.) According to Mr. Wessler, Officer Wiggins was being very 
aggressive, and Mr. Wessler pointed him to Mr. Anderson. (Supp. Tr., p.275, L.24 -
p.276, L.9.) Mr. Anderson had apparently taken Mr. Wessler's advice and gone to 
sleep. (See Supp. Tr., p.276, L.9.) Officer Wiggins went and woke Mr. Anderson up 
and began interrogating him. (Supp. Tr., p.276, Ls.8-13.) Mr. Wessler was present 
during Officer Wiggins's interrogation of Mr. Anderson. (Supp. Tr., p.276, Ls.14-18.) 
Mr. Wessler testified that Officer Wiggins was being "excessively aggressive" toward 
Mr. Anderson, "grill[ing] him" as he was still waking up. (Supp. Tr., p.276, Ls.22-25.) 
10 Mr. Anderson is of dark complexion and black ethnicity. (Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.1.) 
11 It had been nearly thirty years since Officer Wiggins had last conducted a rape 
investigation. (Supp. Tr., p.50, L.24 - p.51, L.2.) 
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Under this pressure, with Officer Wiggins's flashlight in his face, Mr. Anderson remained 
calm and cooperative. (Supp. Tr., p.276, L.25 - p.277, L.5.) 
As the questioning became more intense, Mr. Anderson stated that he wanted to 
talk with an attorney, a request that Mr. Wessler felt was appropriate in the situation. 
(Supp. Tr., p.277, Ls.5-13.) When Mr. Anderson requested an attorney, Mr. Wessler 
testified: 
Officer Wiggins got extremely aggressive. Got right in Ron's face 
and started shouting at him. Basically kind of completely lost his cool. 
I was -- at that point I was sitting in the corner just kind of shocked, not 
knowing what was going on. Nothing had been said to any of us at this 
point. I didn't know charges. I didn't know why the police were there. 
And he [Officer Wiggins] kind of lost his cool. Shouted at Ron for a bit. 
After a few more minutes of that he decided to inform Ron that he was 
going to arrest him. There were no rights read. There was no mention of 
a charge. 
(Supp. Tr., p.277, Ls.14-25.) Mr. Wessler asked one of the Missoula deputies what was 
going on, and the deputy had him step outside, where he said they had been called in 
because of a complaint of rape. (Supp. Tr., p.278, Ls.1-7.) They both went back into 
the cabin, where Officer Wiggins was still questioning Mr. Anderson. (Supp. Tr., p.278, 
Ls.7-9.) Finally, Officer Wiggins, who "was definitely frustrated and still being very 
aggressive at that point" decided to take Mr. Anderson away, and told Mr. Anderson to 
put his pants on, but had to be told by Mr. Wessler that request was impossible while 
he left the handcuffs on Mr. Anderson. (Supp. Tr., p.278, Ls.9-19.) 
Finally, Officer Wiggins got the names of the various employees there, but failed 
to get permanent contact information for them, despite knowing many of them were 
temporary workers. (Supp. Tr., p.77, Ls.2-19.) That included people like Mr. Black, 
who left the Lodge shortly thereafter. (See, e.g., Supp. Tr., p.203, Ls.11-18.) Mr. Black 
could not be located in time for the trial. ( See, e.g., R., p.97.) 
9 
Virtually all the foregoing evidence was presented at Mr. Anderson's trial. ( See 
generally Supp. Tr.) The district court then read several instructions to the jury. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.84, L.9 - p.90, L.25.) Those instructions had been discussed by the 
parties, and were identified as Jury Instructions 10-20 (collectively, "post-proof 
instructions"). 12 (Supp. Tr., p.111, L.12 - p.113, L.25.) Written copies of those 
instructions were provided to the jury. (Tr., Vol.1, p.87, Ls.21-22.) 
The parties then made their closing arguments to the jury. (See generally 
Tr., Vol.1, pp.91-126.) During those arguments, the prosecutor made several 
statements. In regard to the quality of the evidence he had presented, the prosecutor 
declared: 
I thought the nurse practitioner was very credible. 
I was a criminal defense attorney for 15 years. I've been a prosecutor for 
four years, and this in my -- this is some of the best evidence I've 
presented. 
I mean, my gosh, this is great evidence. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.96, L.25 - p.97, L.1, p.120, Ls.14-16; p.123, Ls.7-8.) Additionally, in regard 
to defense counsel's tactical decisions, the prosecutor said: 
I found it interesting, too, that Mr. Dickison in his closing he hardly even 
mentioned Mr. Anderson's testimony .... He never -- he never talked to 
you about his client's version of the events except one or two times. 
Why? Because it's an unbelievable story. And it's uncredible, and it 
doesn't look good to stand up there and talk about his client's story, 
because he knows -- I would submit to you the reason is is [sic] because 
he knows it's not a good story. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.120, p.L.19 - p.121, L.6.) Finally, in regard to the defense presented, the 
prosecutor told the jury: 
12 The instructions in the record constitute only instructions 1-9. (Supp. R., pp.16-38; 
November 29, 2012, Affidavit of Kathy Johnson.) 
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You know, when the defense doesn't have -- when they have a defendant 
that comes up with an unbelievable story they've got to use smoke and 
mirrors. They've got to attack the State. 
That story that Mr. Anderson told was so unbelievable and uncredible 
there was no reason to cross him. And I gladly ask you to bring your own 
common sense into this case, because if you do there's no way in the 
world you can believe Mr. Anderson's story. 
So to bring this out -- again, when you don't have a good story to tell, and 
Mr. Anderson has had a long time to come up with a good story, and that 
was a terrible story. I'm surprised he didn't come up with anything better. 
And you've got to come up with something. If you're the defense, what do 
you do? You've got to attack. You can't just sit back and say nothing. 
You've got to come up with some story. 
That's a ridiculous argument. But, again, you've got to come up with 
something. 
[l]t's an unbelievable story. 
[T]he defense -- they want to come up with stories how they [the injuries] 
happened some way else -- happened some other way. . . . And they 
come up with these stories that are not believable, but yet they throw them 
out to you and want you to believe them. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.117, Ls.7-10, p.117, Ls.14-19, p.118, Ls.19-23, p.120, Ls.16-19, p.121, 
Ls.17-25, p.121, L.2, p.123, Ls.2-7.) After hearing all these statements,13 the 
jury convicted Mr. Anderson. (R., p.68.) The district court told counsel that, "I was 
shocked by this verdict." (Tr., Vol.1, p.146, Ls.1-2.) The district court's statement was 
made in response to Mr. Anderson's motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
and for a new trial, was premised on the sloppy police work and that Ms. Morrison's 
version of events was not corroborated. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.146, L.25 - p.147, 13.) As 
13 All of those statements except the prosecutor's comment on the credibility of Nurse 
Hansen, occurred in the prosecutor's rebuttal statements (see Tr., Vol.1, p.117, Ls.3-6) 
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such, when it heard Mr. Black's testimony, presented in support of Mr. Anderson's 
motion for a new trial, the district court granted that motion. (R., pp.95-108.) 
When the case was remanded following the State's appeal of that decision, the 
district court proceeded to sentence Mr. Anderson. The prosecutor recommended that 
the district court execute a unified sentence of seven to ten years, without a 
recommendation regarding the fixed portion of such a sentence. (Tr., Vol.2, p.10, 
Ls.8-9.) Defense counsel recommended a period of retained jurisdiction, with the 
underlying sentence left to the district court's discretion. (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, Ls.17-20.) 
The district court, however, executed a unified term of eighteen years, with nine years 
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The District Court Erred By Failing To Preserve The Post-Proof Jury Instructions In The 
Record, Thus Depriving Mr. Anderson Of His Right To Due Process 
A. Introduction 
The district court did not preserve a copy of the written post-proof instructions 
which were provided to the jury for use during its deliberations in this case. Because 
reversible error can be found either in the language used in the written instructions, 
even in light of recorded oral instructions, or in the manner in which the written 
instructions present the information to the jury, a copy of those written instructions is 
an essential element of the record for appeal. The district court's failure to preserve an 
adequate record in that regard deprives a defendant of his due process rights. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction and remand his case for 
a new trial. 
B. By Not Preserving A Sufficient Record For Appeal, The District Court Violated 
Mr. Anderson's Due Process Rights 
It is well recognized that, in order to provide a defendant-appellant with due 
process, the State must afford him a sufficient appellate record. Draper v. Washington, 
372 U.S. 487, 498 (1963); see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). A sufficient 
record is one that allows for an adequate review of the proceedings below for errors. 
See State v. Morgan, _ P.3d _, Docket No. 39057, at 2 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462 (2002)), petition for rev. denied. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has consistently held that, when the inadequate appellate record 
is caused by the district court's failure to maintain an adequate record below, that 
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violates the defendant-appellant's due process rights by depriving the proceedings 
of the necessary fundamental fairness. See, e.g., State v. Zielinski, 119 Idaho 316, 318 
(1991); State v. Martinez, 92 Idaho 148, 149-50 (1968); Ebersole v. State, 91 Idaho 
630, 636 (1967). 
One reason why such a failure constitutes a due a process violation is, "where 
pertinent portions of the record are missing, they are presumed to support the actions 
of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted). 
Furthermore, without the written jury instructions, the appellate courts have insufficient 
evidence to find error with the instructions. State v. Walsh, 141 Idaho 870, 877 
(Ct. App. 2005). As a result of this presumption, where the written instructions are not 
preserved in the record, the defendant-appellant is prevented from challenging those 
instructions for error. See id. Therefore, in order to have an adequate review of the jury 
instructions, all the written instructions need to be maintained in the record, or else the 
defendant-appellant is deprived of his constitutional right to due process. See, e.g., 
Draper, 372 U.S. at 498; Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19; Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50; Ebersole, 
91 Idaho at 636. 
Historically, the written jury instructions were "an essential part of the record on 
appeal." State v. Upham, 52 Idaho 340, _, 14 P.2d 1101, 1102 (1932). They are still 
an essential part of the record because all written instructions are required to be 
delivered to the jury when it retires for deliberation. I.C.R. 30(b). As such, if a question 
arises as to the applicable law, the jurors will refer back to the written instructions, and if 
those written instructions contain an error, the jury could reach an inappropriate 
conclusion. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has recognized that simply recording 
the oral recitation of the instructions is insufficient to prevent all such prejudice, as the 
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oral recitation may deviate from the written instructions, causing prejudice to the 
defendant. See State v. Amelia, 144 Idaho 332, 336 (Ct. App. 2007). Such was the 
case in Amelia, even though the written instruction provided to the jury was a correct 
statement of the law. Id. at 334-36. 
In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court has found error where the manner in which 
the instructions are presented is inappropriate, even though the language of the 
instruction parrots the relevant statute. See State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 589-92 
(2011) (holding that an instruction regarding conspiracy (which parroted the language of 
the relevant statute) was nevertheless erroneous because the way in which it listed one 
of the essential elements of the crime could cause it to be reasonably read as an 
alternate theory, rather than a free-standing element, thus impermissibly reducing the 
burden of proof on the state, an error which required vacation of the conviction on that 
charge). Therefore, in order to allow for an adequate review of the jury instructions-
both the language used and the manner in which it presented the instructions-the 
written copy sent with the jury needs to be preserved in the record. See id.; Amelia, 144 
Idaho at 336. 
Such a review cannot happen without a preserved copy of the instructions 
because, "[g]enerally, without a copy of the ... instruction this Court would be without 
sufficient information to evaluate whether [it] was an erroneous statement of the law, 
adequately covered by other instructions, or not supported by the facts of the case." 
Walsh, 141 Idaho at 877; see also Amelia, 144 Idaho at 336; United States v. Wander, 
601 F.2d 1251, 1262-63 (3rd Cir. 1979). As such, a failure to maintain a copy of all the 
written instructions given to the jury deprives the defendant of an adequate record for 
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review, and thus, his due process rights. See, e.g., Draper, 372 U.S. at 498; Griffin, 351 
U.S. at 19; Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50; Ebersole, 91 Idaho at 636. 
In this case, the district court failed to preserve the written copy of the post-proof 
instructions that was provided to the jury. (Compare Supp. R., pp.16-38 (according to 
the November 29, 2012, Affidavit of Kathy Johnson, this is the entire collection of 
instructions which were preserved in the record, and they stop at number 9) with Supp. 
Tr., p.111, L.12 - p.113, L.25 Uury instruction conference discussing instructions 10-20 
and the verdict form) and Tr., Vol.1, p.87, Ls.21-22 (indicating written copies of the 
instructions were prepared for the jury).) By failing to preserve a written copy of the 
post-proof instructions, the district court deprived Mr. Anderson of an adequate 
appellate record and violated his due process rights. 14 Therefore, his conviction should 
be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. See, e.g., Walters, 120 Idaho at 51; 
Draper, 151 Idaho at 592; Amelia, 144 Idaho at 336. 
14 The fact that he cannot review the language in those instructions or the manner in 
which it was presented demonstrates prejudice. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
consistently held that, when the inadequate appellate record is caused by the district 
court's failure to maintain an adequate record below, abstract prejudice constitutes 
constitutional error. See, e.g., Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50; Ebersole, 91 Idaho at 636; 
State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 51 (1990); Zielinski, 119 Idaho at 318. For example, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has clearly held that, where a sufficient record was unavailable, 
"but had a record been available it might have substantiated the defendant's allegation 
that there was prejudicial error in those proceedings," the judgment of conviction based 
on the missing portions of the record cannot stand. Walters, 120 Idaho at 51 (emphasis 
added). According to Walters, the defendant-appellant is entitled to relief if there is only 
a chance that there was error; he need not show actual prejudice. See id. 
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11. 
Mr. Anderson's Conviction Should Be Vacated Because Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
By Vouching For Evidence, Misstating The Law, Disparaging The Defense, And 
Commenting On The Veracity Of Mr. Anderson's Testimony 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Anderson contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case 
which abridged his constitutional rights to due process of law15 and to a fair trial. 16 
While a prosecutor can commit misconduct in numerous ways, the misconduct in this 
case manifested as improper vouching for evidence, misstating the evidence and 
shifting the burden of proof, and disparaging the defense, defense counsel, or defense 
theory. Where such conduct does deprive a defendant of those rights, as it did in this 
case, it constitutes fundamental error, and which is not necessarily harmless. Because 
the prosecutor's misconduct in this case rose to that level, this Court should vacate 
Mr. Anderson's conviction, obtained via the prosecutor's misconduct. 
B. The Events Of Prosecutorial Misconduct In This Case Constituted Fundamental 
Error As They Violated His Unwaived Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial And 
Were Clear From The Record 
Prosecutorial misconduct manifests itself in many forms. For example, it can be 
in the form of "appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of 
inflammatory tactics." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86-87 (Ct. App. 2007) (listing 
various unacceptable ways in which a prosecutor can commit misconduct). Such 
statements are not permissible at trial. Id. The United States and Idaho Supreme 
Courts have both condemned the prosecuting attorney's interjection of his personal 
opinions during a criminal case. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 
15 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I§ 13. 
16 See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I§ 13. 
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(1985); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 753 (1991); overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,432 (1991). In fact, these rules against misconduct: 
apply most stringently to a prosecuting attorney, (because] prosecutors 
too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that 
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give 
more credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of 
the trial and in the presence of a jury than they will give to counsel for the 
accused. It seems they frequently exert their skill and ingenuity to see 
how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in doing 
so they transgress upon the rights of the accused. 
Phillips, 144 Idaho at 88 (quoting State v. /,win, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44 (1903)). As such, 
where the prosecutor does violate this rule and the appellate court "cannot conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's impermissible comments ... did not 
contribute to the jury's verdict," the case needs to be remanded for a new trial. 
State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635,641 (Ct. App. 2011). 
When the defense fails to object to prosecutorial misconduct at trial, it is subject 
to analysis under the fundamental error doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 220 (2010). To show fundamental error in regard to claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct, the appellate court engages in a three-step review, determining: 
"(1) whether misconduct occurred; (2) whether the alleged misconduct rose to the level 
of fundamental error; and (3) whether the misconduct was harmless."17 Id. at 219. 
To determine whether the errors were fundamental, the appellate court considers 
whether "(1) [the error] violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights; (2) the error is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome 
of the trial proceedings." State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 562 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing 
17 The issue of harmlessness will be addressed in detail in Section ll(C), infra. 
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Perry, 150 Idaho at 226). "The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments 
'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 
due process."' State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718-19 (2011) (quoting 
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (in turn quoting Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974))). To that end, statements constituting 
prosecutorial misconduct violate the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. 
Betancourt, 151 Idaho at 640; see State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715-16 (2008). In 
this case, the prosecutor's many instances of misconduct meet that standard, constitute 
fundamental error, and impermissibly tainted the conviction. As such, this Court should 
vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction and remand for a new trial. 
1. By Vouching For The State's Evidence, The Prosecutor Committed 
Misconduct, Justifying Vacating Mr. Anderson's Sentence 
One way a prosecutor can commit misconduct is by vouching during his closing 
arguments for the credibility of the evidence he presented. State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 
364, 368 (Ct. App. 2010). A prosecutor improperly vouches for evidence when he puts 
the prestige of the state behind that evidence, expressing his personal opinions or 
beliefs about the quality of that evidence. Id.; see also State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 
111 (1979); Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 753. However, both sides are allowed, as a matter of 
general policy, to discuss their respective standpoints and the inferences they have 
drawn therefrom. State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 69 (Ct. App. 1998). Three times in this 
case, the prosecutor departed from such permissible conduct and committed 
misconduct by affirtmatively vouching for the evidence he had presented. 
First, the prosecutor declared: a. "I was a criminal defense attorney for 15 years. 
I've been a prosecutor for four years, and this in my -- this is some of the best evidence 
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I've presented." (Tr., Vol.1, p.120, Ls.14-16.) This statement takes the prestige of the 
State ("I've been a prosecutor for four years"), in addition to the prosecutor's reputation 
("I was a criminal defense attorney for 15 years"), and used both to promote the 
credibility of the evidence the State presented at trial ("this is some of the best evidence 
I've presented"). That sort of conduct by a prosecutor is expressly prohibited. Wheeler, 
149 Idaho at 368. 
The prosecutor continued, "the defense -- they want to come up with stories how 
they [Ms. Morrison's injuries] happened some way else -- happened some other 
way .... And they come up with these stories that are not believable, but yet they 
throw them out to you and want you to believe them. I mean, my gosh, this is great 
evidence." (Tr., Vol.1, p.123, Ls.2-8 (emphasis added).) By again offering his opinion 
as to the credibility of the evidence, the prosecutor again committed misconduct. 
Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 753. 
Finally, the prosecutor told the jury outright, "I thought the nurse practitioner was 
very credible." (Tr., Vol.1, p.96, L.25 - p.97, L.1.) This is a textbook example of 
vouching, and thus, prosecutorial misconduct. Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 369 ("Closing 
argument should not include counsel's personal opinions and beliefs about the 
credibility of a witness .... "). 
The prosecutor also vouched against the evidence Mr. Anderson presented. For 
example, the prosecutor told the jury, "to bring this out -- again, when you don't have a 
good story to tell, and Mr. Anderson has had a long time to come up with a good story, 
and that was a terrible story. I'm surprised he didn't come up with anything better." 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.118, Ls.19-23 (emphasis added).) Again, "[t]hat story that Mr. Anderson 
told was so unbelievable and uncredible [sic] there was no reason to cross him. And I 
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gladly ask you to bring your own common sense into this case, because if you do 
there's no way in the world you can believe Mr. Anderson's story." (Tr., Vol.1, p.117, 
Ls.14-19 (emphasis added).) And again, "[defense counsel] never -- he never talked to 
you about his client's version of the events except one or two times. Why? Because it's 
an unbelievable story." (Tr., Vol.1, p.120, L.19- p.121, L.6 (emphasis added).) In each 
of these statements, the prosecutor vouched that Mr. Anderson's testimony was not 
believable. These violations are clear from the record, satisfying the first two aspects 
of the Perry test. 
2. By Misstating The Law In Regard To The Burden Of Proof At The Trial, 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Justifying Vacating 
Mr. Anderson's Sentence 
A prosecutor may also commit misconduct by misrepresenting the law or the 
reasonable doubt burden of proof during his closing argument. Phillips, 144 Idaho 
at 86. Such errors have traditionally been considered to be fundamental in Idaho 
"because it would go to the foundation of the case and would take from [the defendant] 
a right which is essential to his defense." State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 
(1993); State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 910 (Ct. App. 2010). As such, comments or 
instructions which shift the "burden of persuasion on an essential element" are 
erroneous. State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942 (2008); abrogated on other grounds by 
Verksa v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011). Ultimately, the 
prosecutor may not make comments which indicate the defendant has a responsibility 
to present evidence in his defense. See, e.g., State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 482 
(2012), reh'g denied (noting in that case, "the prosecution never stated that Adamcik 
had the responsibility to test the evidence .... ") 
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To determine whether such a violation has occurred, the appellate courts must 
carefully scrutinize the actual words used and the way in which a reasonable juror could 
interpret those words. Mubita, 145 Idaho at 942. If the words the prosecutor uses, as 
they could be reasonably interpreted, "diminish[ ] or distort[ ]" the State's burden, then 
the prosecutor has committed misconduct. State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 
(Ct. App. 2010). 
In this case, the prosecutor made two statements which told the jury that the 
defense had to present evidence or offer a theory of the crime: first, he told the jury, 
"[a]nd you've got to come up with something. If you're the defense, what do you do? 
You've got to attack. You can't just sit back and say nothing. You've got to come up 
with some story." (Tr., Vol.1, p.120, 16-19.) He continued, "[t]hat's a ridiculous 
argument. But, again, you've got to come up with something." (Tr., Vol.1, p.121, 
Ls.17-25.) A reasonable jury would interpret those arguments to mean that, in the 
absence of a good defense, it could convict even if the State failed to actually prove the 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. That diminishes the State's burden to prove 
Mr. Anderson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, constitutes misconduct. 
See Mubita, 145 Idaho at 942; Erickson, 148 Idaho at 685. 
Those statements also do not accurately reflect the state of the law, because the 
defendant is never required to "come up with something." Cf, Brooks v. Tennessee, 
406 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1972) (holding a defendant need not disclose whether he intends 
to testify or offer defense witnesses before trial because he cannot be sure until after 
the State has presented its evidence whether such testimony will be necessary or 
helpful to his case); State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 623, 627 (Ct. App. 2011) (declaring 
that neither direct nor indirect comments on the defendant's failure to present evidence 
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through his own testimony are permissible). This also impermissibly alters the burden 
of proof because it would force the defendant to prove his innocence in light of the 
evidence presented by the State. 
The only exception to this fundamental premise is if the prosecutor's comment is 
limited to the defense's failure to produce material evidence or call a logical witness. 
Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 482 (holding that statements that "[the defensne] could have 
tested the other shirt, the other pair of gloves, and all the other items that were in 
evidence. And they chose not to do that," to be permissible); Mendoza, 151 Idaho at 
627 (holding that statements like "[s]he kept the envelope, crumpled up and put it in her 
purse, but where is that evidence now? She hasn't produced it," to be permissible). 
However, in this case, the prosecutor did not comment on a particular piece of evidence 
or particular testimony that Mr. Anderson did not present. ( See Tr., Vol.1, p.120, 16-19, 
p.121, Ls.17-25.) Rather, like in Erickson, it asserted that he needed to refute the 
evidence in general, which is an incorrect statement of the law. See Erickson, 158 
Idaho at 685-86 (holding that statements like "but there is also a downside to it. I can't 
bring you the petfect case. There will always be the possibility there," are sufficient to 
impermissibly alter the burden of proof (emphasis in original)). These violations are 
clear from the record, satisfying the first two aspects of the Perry test. 
3. By Disparaging The Defense And Its Theory Of The Case, The Prosecutor 
Committed Misconduct, Justifying Vacating Mr. Anderson's Sentence 
Another way in which a prosecutor can commit misconduct is by "mak[ing] 
personal attacks on defense counsel in closing argument." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 
15, 19 (Ct. App. 2008); see also State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003); 
Young, 470 U.S. at 8-9 & n.7. By the same token, a prosecutor can also commit 
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misconduct if he disparages or distorts the defense presented. See, e.g., 
State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 576 (2007); see also Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87 (finding 
misconduct where the prosecutor invited the jury to feel "irritated" by the defense 
presented). 
The prosecutor made several such impermissible comments in this case, 
disparaging both defense counsel and the defense theory. In regard to defense 
counsel's decisions in his representation of Mr. Anderson, the prosecutor said: 
I found it interesting, too, that [defense counsel] in his closing he hardly 
even mentioned Mr. Anderson's testimony. . . . He never -- he never 
talked to you about his client's version of the events except one or two 
times. Why? Because it's an unbelievable story. And it's uncredible, and 
it doesn't look good to stand up there and talk about his client's story, 
because he knows -- I would submit to you the reason is is [sic] because 
he knows it's not a good story. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.120, L.19- p.121 L.6.) Like in Sheahan and Gross, these comments which 
suggest that defense counsel has knowingly elicited false testimony constitutes 
misconduct. See Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280; Gross, 146 Idaho at 19. 
jury: 
Furthermore, in regard to Mr. Anderson's defense theory, the prosecutor told the 
So to bring this out -- again, when you don't have a good story to tell, and 
Mr. Anderson has had a long time to come up with a good story, and that 
was a terrible story. I'm surprised he didn't come up with anything better. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.118, Ls.19-23 (emphasis added).) Moments later, the prosecutor 
improperly declared: "That's a ridiculous argument. But, again, you've got to come up 
with something." (Tr., Vol.1, p.121, Ls.17-25.) He continued: "And you've got to come 
up with something. If you're the defense, what do you do? You've got to attack. You 
can't just sit back and say nothing. You've got to come up with some story." (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.120, 16-19.) And finally, "You know, when the defense doesn't have -- when they 
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have a defendant that comes up with an unbelievable story they've got to use smoke 
and mirrors. They've got to attack the State." (Tr., Vol.1, p.117, Ls.7-10.) Time and 
again during his closing remarks, the prosecutor disparaged the defense presented and 
the means by which it was presented. These statements are impermissible. See, e.g., 
Gross, 146 Idaho at 19; Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576. These violations are clear from the 
record, satisfying the first two aspects of the Perry test. 
C. The Individual Errors Were Not Harmless In This Case 
As the district court stated during the hearing on Mr. Anderson's motion for a new 
trial, it felt that this case was very close to resulting in an acquittal: "I have to say I was 
shocked by this verdict. ... Let me tell you the two things that bother me most about 
this case was the really sloppy police work ... [and] there was one impartial witness ... 
contradict[ing] everything [the victim] had to say." (Tr., Vol.1, p.146, Ls.1-2; Tr., Vol.1, 
p.146, L.25 - p.147, L.13.) While the independent witness referred to was not able to be 
located before the trial, the district court's comments reveal how close the case was. 
As to Ms. Morrison's testimony, its reliability was called into question by the other 
evidence in the record. For example, there was an absence of injuries to 
Ms. Morrison's vaginal area. (Supp. Tr., p.144, Ls.6-7.) This is highly probative 
because she testified that she was trying to fight off Mr. Anderson, who was being 
"really brutal," and get away to the door for thirty to forty-five minutes. (See Supp. 
Tr., p.185, Ls.20-25; Supp. Tr., p.187, Ls.6-7, p.188, L.12; Supp. Tr., p.186, Ls.10-24.) 
She also told Officer Wiggins that there was blood all over her blanket and the floor. 
(See, e.g., Defense Exhibit Bat 12:20.) However, Officer Wiggins noticed no blood on 
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the floor, and did not deem it necessary to seize the blanket as evidence that night. 18 
(See, e.g., Supp. Tr., p.69, L.25 - p.70, L.14; Supp. Tr., p.102, L.24 - p.103, L.2 
(indicating Officer Wiggins did not seize the blanket until a follow up investigation a wee 
later.) 
Ms. Morrison also did not inform Nurse Hansen that she had run barelegged 
through foliage and across gravel, which likely impacted Nurse Hansen's conclusions 
about the scratches to Ms. Morrison's back, legs, and buttocks. Those scratches 
were instead attributed to Mr. Anderson when he supposedly took her pants off. 
(See Defense Exhibit Bat 4: 15.) However, according to Officer Skott Mealer, there was 
no evidence of a struggle on Mr. Anderson - no debris or blood under his fingernails 
and no other signs of a struggle on him. (Supp. Tr., p.214, Ls.7-20.) Furthermore, 
Nurse Hansen testified that Ms. Morrison had told her she had been bitten multiple 
times, but when she testified at trial, Ms. Morrison said there was only one bite. 
(Compare Supp. Tr., p.139, Ls.19-20 with Supp. Tr., p.189, Ls.7-9.) The lack of 
physical evidence corroborating Ms. Morrison's testimony demonstrates the 
insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction in this case. 
Furthermore, the testimony of independent witnesses also belies Ms. Morrison's 
assertions about the commotion she was making. Mr. Wessler testified that 
Mr. Anderson came into his cabin at approximately 11 :30. (Supp. Tr., p.270, Ls.5-10.) 
As such, Mr. Anderson would not have arrived at Ms. Morrison's trailer until 
approximately midnight. Therefore, the time frame she gave (a total of thirty to forty-five 
minutes) would mean that Mr. Anderson would have had to still be assaulting her when 
18 While the blanket was ultimately seized as evidence a week later, no follow up 
investigation was performed on it. (Supp. Tr., p.102, L.24 - p.103, L.12.) 
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Mr. MacDuff was walking up to his trailer at approximately 12:30. (See Supp. 
Tr., p.160, Ls.8-10 (Mr. MacDuff testifying he left the bar at approximately 12:30); Supp, 
Tr., p.126, L.10 (Officer Wiggins testifying he received the call out at 12:48).) And 
Ms. Morrison testified that she was screaming, fighting, and resisting Mr. Anderson 
throughout the incident. (Supp. Tr., p.185, Ls.20-25, p.187, Ls.6-7, p.188, L.12.) The 
two trailers were relatively close to each other. (State's Exhibit 36 (Officer Wiggins' 
diagram of the area, indicating the trailers are forty feet apart); see State's Exhibit 9 
(photograph showing Mr. MacDuff's trailer from Ms. Morrison's trailer).) However, 
Mr. MacDuff apparently did not hear anything distressing or out of the ordinary, as he 
went into his house and began to fix himself some food. (See Supp. Tr., p.160, 
Ls.8-18.) 
In addition, Mr. Anderson did not exhibit guilty behavior. For example, he stayed 
in Ms. Morrison's trailer after she left, believing she intended to return. 
(Supp. Tr., p.258, Ls.7-20.) He also did not try to hide when Officer Wiggins drove past 
him in a marked police vehicle. (See Supp. Tr., p.259, Ls.13-22; Supp. Tr., p.14, 
Ls.16-21; Supp. Tr., p. 71, Ls.21-25 (describing the markings on the vehicle).) This 
evidence, indicating that nothing inappropriate occurred between Mr. Anderson and 
Ms. Morrison, further demonstrates the insufficiency of the State's evidence. 
Therefore, as recognized by the district court, this is not a case where there is 
overwhelming evidence of guilt. Quite to the contrary, the jury could have very easily 
acquitted Mr. Anderson. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.146, Ls.1-2; Tr., Vol.1, p.146, L.25 - p.147, 
L.13.) As such, the harm done by each incident of misconduct, particularly those 
comments on the credibility of certain evidence or testimony, is increased in this case, 
to the point where it is beyond mere possibility that each individual instance could have 
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swayed the jury's verdict, thereby depriving Mr. Anderson of a fair trial. Compare 
Phillips, 144 Idaho at 89 (holding that, because the verdict in that case hinged largely on 
the credibility determination, the pattern of misconduct there increased the chances that 
the misconduct impacted the verdict, resulting in the need to vacate the conviction); see 
also Betancourt, 151 Idaho at 640 (reversing a conviction because the court could not 
determine "beyond a reasonable doubt that the incident of prosecutorial misconduct did 
not contribute to the verdict"). As such, based on the facts of this case, if misconduct is 
shown, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement did not 
contribute to the verdict. Therefore, each improper statement in this case violated 
Mr. Anderson's unwaived constitutional right to a fair trial, was clear o n the record, and 
was not harmless. Therefore, each improper statement individually constitutes 
fundamental error, entitling Mr. Anderson to a new trial. 
111. 
The Accumulation Of Errors In This Case Deprived Mr. Anderson Of A Fair Trial 
Although Mr. Anderson contends that each of the errors complained of above 
were prejudicial, to the extent that this Court disagrees and finds any of those errors to 
be harmless, Mr. Anderson asserts that he is entitled to a new trial nonetheless. He 
submits that the above errors, when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in 
contravention of his constitutional right to due process. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 
629, 635, 51 P.3d 443, 449 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 513, 
960 P.2d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 
708, 716 (1994). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on these errors, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that his conviction be 
reversed, or alternatively, that his conviction be vacated and his case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DI 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
30 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of December, 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
RONALD E ANDERSON 
INMATE #101015 
IMSI 
PO BOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
MICHAEL J GRIFFIN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
GREGORY C DICKISON 
LATAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
BRD/eas 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
31 
··~,, ·~ 
'\ 
,~,,";Jf! 
